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Abstract 
The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm 
performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's 
riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options 
and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-
French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher 
return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO 
incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides 
support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs 
and shareholders. 
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1. Introduction
Agency conflicts between shareholders and managers are prevalent in modern 
corporations and are one of the most heavily studied topics in the finance literature. While 
chief executive officers (CEOs) are assumed to work for the best interest of shareholders, 
they can readily pursue own interests at the expense of shareholders’ interest. As Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue, CEOs with a little ownership can consume more perquisites and 
reduce their firm values. To incentivize CEOs with a little or no ownership, firms start 
granting equity-based compensation, which presumably aligns shareholders interest with 
CEOs. 
The practice of equity-based compensation has doubled since 1990s and is still growing. 
The main purpose of incorporating equity in the compensation package is to motivate 
managers to engage in activities that will maximize shareholders’ wealth. Murphy (1999) 
explains that when executives are given the opportunity to become part-owners of the firm, 
they note the opportunity to increase their wealth with the increase in stock returns. Thus, 
executives will engage in behaviors that will increase the performance of the firm, leading to 
an increase in stock price performance. As a result, executives can cash in large 
compensation. Researchers have studied the relationship between the incentive compensation 
and the firm performance by several measures. Among them, the pay-performance sensitivity 
and the pay-volatility sensitivity are the two most important measures of CEO incentive in 
the literature (Murphy 2012). 
However, the practice in CEO compensation during the past few decades raises doubt to 
its efficacy. While the equity-based compensation significantly increases the CEO pay over 
time, it is still in debate whether the incentive compensation indeed improves the firm 
performance and/or risk taking. The debate in the literature provides the motivation for this 
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paper to scrutinize the relationship between incentive compensation and firm performance 
using different aspects.  Studies in CEO compensation report mixed results on the 
effectiveness of CEO compensation on the firm performance. The goal of this article is to 
examine whether incentive compensation increases firm performance, measured by stock 
returns, operating performance, and risk taking. The paper differs from the existing literature 
by being the first study in incentive compensation to use the Fama-French three factor model 
(Fama and French, 1993) and by providing evidence that managers with higher PPS increase 
firm performance. Furthermore, this study uses various aspects of firm performance measures 
to address the relationship, whereas other studies use only one to two measures. Therefore, it 
contributes to the literature of executive compensation by examining whether equity-based 
compensation motivates executives to exert effort that increases shareholders’ wealth. 
The pay-performance sensitivity has received extensive attention in incentive 
compensation to CEOs. Primarily, researchers became interested in examining whether 
shareholders are receiving what they are paying for (Cooper, Gulen and Rau, 2014). Jensen 
and Murphy (1990) argue that the issue rises due to information asymmetry between the 
shareholders and the executives. The asymmetric information occurs because shareholders do 
not have complete information about the executives’ activities and the firm’s investment 
opportunities. Since shareholders are interested in maximizing their wealth, they are 
concerned about whether executives exert effort to increase shareholders’ wealth. On the 
other hand, executives are interested in their private gains and the cost of pursuing different 
actions. Dow and Raposo (2005) point out that executive incentive compensation is an 
essential key to align the interest of managers and shareholders.   
To examine the relationship above, we obtain the sample of CEO compensation available 
in the ExecuComp database. We estimate the pay-performance sensitivity and pay-volatility 
sensitivity for each CEO in the sample firms, following the method by Deniel, Li and Naveen 
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(2012) and Core and Guay (2002). Even though we follow their method of estimating CEO 
incentive compensation, this paper has a different goal from them.  Core and Guay (2002) 
only present and validate the one-year approximation method for estimating the CEO 
incentive. Daniel, Li and Naveen (2013) are more into finding CEO pay for luck. Their 
dependent variable was firm-related wealth. Therefore, they study the relationship between 
firm related wealth and CEO luck. Both papers did not see the relationship between incentive 
compensation and firm performance. This paper computes annual stock return performance, 
operating performance and risk taking of all the firms and examines the relationship between 
incentive compensation and firm performance using these different measures. 
The results of this paper show positive relations between incentive compensation and firm 
performance and suggest that incentive compensation to executives is important in 
motivating executives on behalf of shareholders and contributes to enhancing firm 
performance. Thus, the results contrast the findings of negative relationship in recent studies. 
Furthermore, incentive compensation can help mitigate agency conflicts since the interest of 
executives are aligned with that of shareholders by motivating executives to work for the best 
interest of shareholders. Therefore, it also supports the agency theory literature by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). The results of this study reduce concerns on many recent studies, which 
find that incentive compensation does not help improve firm performance and imply that 
shareholders do not receive what they pay for (Cooper, Gulen and Rau, 2014, Brick, Palmon 
and Wald, 2006, Bebchuk and Fried, 2005).    
This paper contributes to the literature of executive compensation in three ways. First, the 
study directly examines whether managerial incentives provided by equity-based 
compensation improve stock price performance and/or operating performance. While most 
studies in the literature focus on executive compensation as a whole or as individual 
components for firm performance, we investigate the direct relation between pay-
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performance sensitivities (PPS) and firm performance and between pay-volatility sensitivities 
(PVS) and risk taking. Second, although information on managers’ PPS is publicly available 
and must have been reflected into stock prices in efficient capital markets, we find that 
managers with higher PPS increase firm performance both in stock returns and in earnings 
from operation. Third, while managers in the modern corporations have little share-
ownership in their firms, the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers can be 
significantly reduced by granting equity-based compensation to managers. Hence, the current 
trend toward a high level of executive compensation provided mostly by equity-based 
incentives might be a natural practice among modern corporations. 
  This paper is divided into several sections. Section 2 provides a detail overview of the 
literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses of this paper. In section 4, I explain the process 
of data collection and show pattern in the data sample. Section 5 presents methodologies used 
to estimate pay-performance sensitivity, pay-volatility sensitivity and control variables and to 
examine the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. In section 
6, I discuss the results that are obtained from testing the hypotheses and robustness. Lastly, 
Section 7 presents conclusion. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Importance of Executive Compensation and Stock Incentive 
Executive compensation first received attention when researcher identified the 
existence of agency problems between shareholders and managers. In principle, shareholders 
should design an optimal contract including incentive compensation, which motivates 
managers to improve firm performance. Incentive compensation can be structured by 
shareholders because it is hard to construct a perfect contract between managers and 
shareholders. If shareholders have all the information about the executive decisions and 
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activities, they can create a perfect contract which maximizes shareholders’ value. However, 
it is not possible to design a perfect contract in practice. Therefore, shareholders need to 
design contracts that will provide incentives for executives to take decisions and implement 
actions that will enhance shareholder wealth. One way of doing this is to design executive 
compensation which is aligned with maximizing shareholder wealth. Therefore, equity-based 
compensation became extremely popular in 1960s, when the rise of equity-based 
compensation was about 41 times that in a typical U.S. factory worker (Langsam, Kreuze and 
Newell, 1997). 
However, the managerial power approach tend to differ from this concept. According 
to Bedchuk and Fried (2003), CEO compensation is not only an instrument for addressing 
agency problem but also a part of it as some features of pay arrangements reflect managerial 
rent-seeking behavior. CEOs have substantial influence over their own pay by providing a 
different set of incentive to directors (Weisbach, 2007). CEOs can shift director’s focus to 
consider CEO’s interests rather than the interest of shareholders. According to Weisbach 
(2007), directors have incentive to keep their jobs and CEOs can provide benefits to directors 
in many different ways. Furthermore, CEOs can use their influence to help directors attain 
additional directorships. Overall, directors have incentives to act on behalf of the CEOs. 
However, while the relationship between the directors' compensation and firm performance 
might be important, I focus my study on CEO compensation. 
As CEO activities affect the future performance of the firm, any component that can 
influence the firm’s strategies are considered to be an important factor. Executive 
compensation holds great power to influence CEO activities (Jensen and Murphy, 1990 and 
Dow and Raposo, 2005). If executive compensation is designed in such a way that variations 
in compensation are associated with that in firm performance, the CEO’s decision making 
process will be more affected as this decision will be tied to the personal benefits of the CEO. 
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To elaborate the connection, Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain “why managers will engage 
in activities that make the firm value less than it would be if they were the sole owners of the 
firm”. Managers seem to be more cautious if they have considerable amount of wealth tied to 
the firm. The attached wealth discourages them to misuse firm resources and encourages 
them to engage in behaviors that will improve the firm value. When a manager’s wealth is 
not tied to the firm, agency conflicts arise. Therefore, executive incentive compensation may 
potentially play a vital role in reducing agency conflicts and increasing shareholders’ wealth. 
Akindayomi and Warsame (2009) argue that shareholders and executives have 
different goals and risk preferences. CEOs want to maintain and increase their incomes and 
reputation. On the other hand, to get higher returns, managers must take higher risk. 
According to Amihud and Lev (1981), CEOs are more worried about the losses associated 
with risk-taking, which prevents them from taking risk. Low (2009) documents that this risk 
aversion behavior of managers can reduce the firm`s much needed risk, consequently 
adversely impacting shareholder wealth. 
Murphy (1999) shows several features of executive compensation. Among them 
equity-based compensation plays a vital role in influencing CEO decision, since stock returns 
fluctuate with firm performance and firm performance varies with CEO’s decisions. 
Therefore, equity-based compensation in the executive compensation package provides the 
incentive to the managers to make decisions that will enhance the firm performance, which 
will have a positive effect on the stock price and ultimately increase the CEO wealth. Stock 
options as part of executive compensation can help decrease the risk preference and the goal 
difference between shareholders and executives since shareholders are always interested in 
maximizing their own wealth. The alignment between firm performance and compensation 
can help executives make decisions that will reward them as well as reward the shareholders 
(Amihud and Lev, 1981). Smith and Stulz (1985) also documents that equity-based 
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compensation awarded to managers can overcome managerial risk aversion behavior and 
encourage them to engage in efficient risk-taking behavior. 
Langsam, Kreuze and Newell (1997) find that stock options are very beneficial for top 
executives. Moreover, stock options are cash free to the companies and most options are not 
required to be reported as expenses. The authors also argue that firms take the difference of 
option price and market price as a deduction when calculating taxable income. Therefore, 
both parties benefit through stock option in executive compensation packages. Carola and 
Dirk (2010) argue that the idea behind stock option compensation is to link executive 
compensation to share price, thus providing incentives for CEOs to improve the shareholder 
value. Hence, stock options became the largest component of executive compensation during 
1980s and 1990s. The authors also find that CEO pay has increased dramatically over the last 
30 years. The increase is noticed for all sizes of firms but the growth has been much steeper 
for larger firms. However, after the stock market decline in the early 2000 stock options have 
lost some of its strength. As equity-based incentives become more popular in executive 
compensation, managers tend to become more flexible to risk taking behavior. Other studies 
also have found alternative mechanisms to efficiently utilize equity-based incentives in 
executive compensation. For example, Edmans et al., (2012) implement the Dynamic 
Incentive Account technique to constantly motivate executives to exert effort in improving 
firm performance for both current and future periods. 
On the other hand, studies have found that such incentives are actually decreasing the 
value of the firm. According to Ross (2004) stock options to CEO compensation can make 
executives more risk averse, which may result in underinvestment. Moreover, through 
executive stock options, managers can become short sighted and focus on short-term stock 
price (Peng & Roell, 2008). Sanders and Hambrick (2007) show that more option-loaded 
executives tend to pursue higher risk taking decision without thinking much about the 
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downside, which leads them to produce big losses rather than big gains. Furthermore, the 
well-known Greenbury Report (1995) in UK points out that share price increase might not 
result from CEO actions but reflect inflation and general market movements. Therefore, there 
is a mixed review on the efficacy of incentive compensation of CEO and this paper addresses 
the issue by showing that equity-based incentives play a prominent role when considering the 
effect of executive compensation on firm performance.  
2.2 Other Form of Pay and Compensation Level 
Prior research on executive compensation has focused mostly on the four basic components 
of the CEO compensation: base salary, annual bonus tied to accounting performance, stock 
options, and long-term incentive plans in the form of restricted stock plans and multi-year 
accounting-based performance plan (Murphy, 1999). Michaud and Gai (2009) use 6 similar 
categories to measure executive compensation. Even though stock options became extremely 
popular in executive pay, other components of the pay have also increased over the years.  
Ozkan (2011) finds a positive and significant relationship between CEO cash 
compensation and firm performance. Also, Gaver and Gaver (1998) find a significant positive 
relation between CEO cash compensation and positive above line earnings. These studies 
indicate the importance of cash compensation in executive compensation packages. In 
addition, Leone, Wu and Zimmerman (2006) document that executive cash compensation is 
twice more sensitive to negative stock returns than to positive stock returns. Shaw and Zhang 
(2010) suggest that CEO cash compensation is not penalized for firms that are not performing 
well. These findings show the impact of total cash compensation on executive compensation 
and this paper uses it as one of the control variables.  
Therefore, studies have shown that apart from stock incentive, other forms of pay also 
have considerable impacts on executive compensation, and it is natural to expect that more 
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forms of pay are yet to be pursued. For example, Carola and Dirk (2010) consider perquisite, 
which is a part of agency conflicts (Jensen & Meckling 1976) to be a form of executive pay. 
Rajan and Wulf (2006) also justify perks to be an efficient mechanisms to increase 
managerial productivity. Even though other forms of pay has some impact on executive 
compensation, equity-based incentive has the most significant impact on executive pay 
package as it can be tied up with shareholders wealth maximization need.  
In the literature there have been concerns about the level of CEO compensation 
package. Most general public finds the compensation packages to be higher than they should 
be (Bebchuk and Fried, 2005). Hurtt, Kreuze and Langsam (1998) find that CEOs of Social 
Choice firms are paid higher than CEOs from other firms even though the performance of 
CEOs are measured through shareholder returns. Furthermore, Michaud and Gai (2009), and 
Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2014) find no evidence that CEO compensation has any effect on 
future stock-price performance, suggesting that shareholders are not receiving what they are 
paying for. Therefore, there is a demand from shareholders for monitoring executive 
compensation. However, Gox, Imhof and Kunz (2011) argue that shareholders having a say 
in executive compensation can lead to more complicated scenarios. They find that while a 
shareholders’ say is ineffective in limiting the rise in executive compensation, it can increase 
executive compensation for poorly governed firms. Moreover, shareholders’ say can interrupt 
the CEO focus from investment incentives and eventually decrease the firm value. 
To help monitor and justify CEO compensation package, research started looking at 
executive compensation from a third party point of view. Ozkan (2011) finds that institutional 
shareholders play a vital role in determining the CEO compensation level. She shows a 
positive and significant relationship between institutional shareholders and CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivities of option grants. Cadman, Carter and Hillegeist (2010) find 
evidence on the importance of compensation advisors to setup an efficient contract between 
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firms and executives. Their studies also find no biasness from advisors toward excessive 
CEO pay and the widespread usage of advisors.  Hence, corporations are trying to control and 
justify the optimum level of executive pay. They are actively involving outside consults to 
justify and setup an efficient contract that can benefit both the executive and the firm. 
To setup an efficient contract, both shareholders and executives have to be benefited 
from the contract. Equity-based compensation can act as an important factor in setting-up 
such contract since, it provides an opportunity for the executive to increase their wealth by 
increasing the stock performance of the firm. Langsam, Kreuze and Newell (1997) report 
evidence that while the executive compensation in the United States increased drastically in 
the 1990s, the increase in executive pay level started rising from the mid-1900s. In the 1960s, 
the rise was about 41 times that in a typical U.S. factory worker and in 1990, it became 157 
times. During this rise, the equity-based incentives became extremely popular as it did not 
require to be recognized as an expense and it helps motivate managers to take decisions that 
will optimize firm performance. Therefore, equity-based incentives in the executive 
compensation rose by 45% in 1995. 
2.3 Pay for performance  
Jensen and Murphy (1990) introduce pay-performance sensitivity as a way to measure 
the relation between executive compensation and firm performance. The authors find a small 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. The relationship is 
tested using different approaches, which are then compared with each other. The results 
reveal that there is a very low variability in executive compensation and that bonuses are not 
highly sensitive to performance, suggesting the absence of decent pay-for-performance 
sensitivities for executives. Recall that executive compensation can play an important role in 
solving agency problems and help lead to maximizing shareholder wealth. Therefore, a lack 
of strong pay-for-performance incentives for executives raise several potential questions in 
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the executive compensation literature. The reason why the authors find a small relationship is 
due to the time period of their data ranging from 1974 to 1986. Recall that incentive 
compensation became extremely popular during mid-1990s as equity-based compensation 
rose by 45% in 1995.  
The idea of adding equity-based incentives to executive compensation packages to 
improve firm performance has been refuted by several studies because researchers find no 
positive relationship between CEO pay and firm performance (Cooper, Gulen and Rau, 2014, 
Michuad and Gai, 2009 and Brick, Palmon and Wald, 2006). This may seem perplexing to 
shareholders, since executives are paid to perform and to ensure value maximization for 
shareholders.  
Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2014) find evidence that a highly paid CEO with an 
overconfident attitude tends to engage in value destroying activities which lead to 
significantly lower stock returns. Firms with the highest paid and overconfident CEOs deliver 
lower future returns relative to those with the other CEOs and experience lower operating 
performance. Therefore, as the authors conclude, excess incentive pay (restricted stock, 
options and other forms of long term compensation) has a significant, negative relationship 
with future one-year abnormal returns. Even though these findings can give a negative signal 
on the stock option grant to executive compensation, Cooper, Gulen and Rau (2014) do not 
use pay-performance sensitivity as a measure of pay-for-performance. The authors estimate 
incentive compensation as the difference between total compensation and total cash 
compensation (TDC1-TCC). Hence, it is not clear that there is a negative relationship 
between firm performance and executive incentives. Michaud and Gai (2009) also report that 
there is no positive effect on firm performance through executive compensation. 
Furthermore, incentive packages to the executives do not have any effect on firm`s 
performance.  The authors find only cash bonus to have a significant positive effect on firm 
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performance. Then again, the authors do not use pay-performance sensitivity as measure of 
pay-for-performance. Furthermore, they do not use stock returns as a firm performance 
measure.    
Benmelech, Kandel and Veronesi (2010) link equity-based compensation to 
consequent stock price downfall. Therefore, the result is poor firm performance. Managers 
engage in fraudulent behavior, which leads to overvaluation of stock prices and in turn to a 
crash in stock price. Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) also find evidence that the excess 
executive compensation is negatively related to stock-price performance. They suggest that 
weaker corporate governance structure leads to greater agency conflicts, which cause higher 
executive compensation firms and that with poor governance perform below expectation. 
Similarly, Ariely et al., (2009) find that the increase in rewards can cause damaging effects 
on firm performance. Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) find a similar negative relation 
between future return on assets and excess CEO compensation by relating CEO 
compensation directly to directors’ compensation. They prove a significant positive relation 
between CEO and director compensation and find that firm performance is negatively related 
to excess director compensation. Cheng and Farber (2008) show that a decrease in the option-
based executive compensation improves firm profitability. They suggest that as option-based 
incentives decrease, CEOs’ motivation to take excessive risk reduces, and leads to improve 
the profitability. Malmendier and Tate (2008) coin the term “CEO Disease” referring to a 
pattern that executives tend to underperform after reaching a valuable position in the 
organization. The authors find a strong negative relationship between the superstar executive 
pay system and stock-price performance. Even though the stock performance declines, these 
executives are paid significantly more through equity-based compensation, especially in 
firms with poor corporate governance. Additionally, these CEOs consume more perquisites 
due to agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and thus divert from shareholder value 
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maximization. All these findings are suggesting that executives are not working for the 
shareholders. However, this paper is significantly different from all these studies as it uses 
different measures of executive incentive. Furthermore, this paper is using various aspects of 
firm performance to see the relationship between incentive compensation and firm 
performance. For example, Langsam, Kreuze and Newell (1997) study the relation between 
executive compensation and traditional performance variables. The study reveals that 
executive compensation has no relation to most of the traditional performance measures. 
Then again, this paper uses completely different measure for firm performance and executive 
incentives.  
Murphy (1999) examines the effect of CEO pay-performance sensitivity on firm 
performance and suggests that CEOs do understand the impact of their decisions on 
accounting profits but have very little understanding on how their decisions are influencing 
the shareholder value. Moreover, research shows that factor driving executive compensation 
is the firm size, which is used by researchers for benchmarking. Baker, Jensen, and Murphy 
(1988) show evidence that large firms pay their executives more than small firms. However, 
such pattern is expected since larger firms has more capital to support such action. 
Despite the negative relationship in many studies, the practice of restricted stock grant 
has increased significantly by 2011. Most of the growth in executive compensation since 
1990 has been due to the significant increase in equity-based pay. Restricted stock grants 
have risen to 36% of the executive pay (Murphy 2012), suggesting that stock grant can have 
positive impact on executive incentives. Murphy (2012) shows that government intervention 
in executive compensation has been a major driver in executive pay and that this idea has 
been largely ignored by most researchers. Government intervenes indirectly through 
accounting rules, securities laws, and tax policies that cause an impact on the level and 
structure of executive pay. Murphy (2012) points out that government intervention in 
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executive compensation is a new dimension in the pay-for-performance analysis as the 
interest of the government is significantly different from the interest of the shareholders, 
directors or executives. The government intervention can make significant changes in the 
literature because shareholders want to increase the executive pay with firm’s performance, 
but the government wants to control such increases through the different impositions. In 
addition, the author also mention that while both grant-date and realized pay are legitimate 
measures of executive compensation, researchers who are regressing grant-date pay level on 
firm’s performance tend to conclude that there is no executive incentives for performance. 
The result is contradicted by the result from regressing executives’ realized pay on firm 
performance. Murphy (2012) strongly argue that the realized pay is significantly related to 
firm’s performance. 
Similarly, Larcker and Tayan (2011) consider no “pay for performance” in CEO 
compensation as a myth of corporate governance. CEOs can realize the considerable amount 
of wealth through stock price appreciation due to their possession of stock options from 
executive compensation. Moreover, the authors also argue that the concept of CEOs being 
overpaid is a myth as well. Core and Larcker (2002) find the evidence of improvement in 
firm performance relative to the level of managerial equity ownership. The authors use a 
“target ownership plan” approach, where a sample of firm with low stock returns is adopted. 
The managerial stock ownership increases significantly for the firms adopting the plan within 
a short period and leads to the excess stock price returns, which become statistically 
significant. Bulan, Sanyal and Yan (2010) find a positive relationship between CEO pay-for-
performance and the real side of firm’s performance.  They consider restricted stock grants to 
be an efficient and effective tool to align CEO goals with those of shareholders’, since stock 
grants can be a means of rewarding performance.  Hence, the authors suggest that the 
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sensitivity of CEO wealth to percentage changes in stock return volatility (VEGA) can 
enhance the firm’s productivity, which is considered as a genuine performance.  
Overall, previous studies have discovered a wide range of connections between 
executive compensation and firm performance. Some approaches result in positive significant 
relationships, whereas others have found negative significant associations. Thus, this paper 
enrich the current debate in executive compensation literature by analyzing the subject from 
different aspects and compares the results with one another.  
I examine the efficacy of incentive compensation by conducting a study on the 
relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. I attempt to answer 
whether executive incentive compensation has an impact on the overall performance of the 
firm. I examine the relationship of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) with different firm 
performance measures and compare the results of the findings in the literature. I start with the 
relationship by measuring firm performance from stock-price performance. I move on the 
analysis with the operating performance. Furthermore, I compute pay-volatility sensitivity 
(PVS) to see the relationship to the firm’s risk taking and then compare the findings with 
PPS.  
2.4 Pay-volatility Sensitivity 
Recall that manager’s risk-taking can have a significant influence on the firm 
performance. Hence, another conflict of interest arises between shareholders and executives 
due to typical behavior of executives being risk-averse. Since equity can be considered an 
option on the asset, the value of equity increases with the risk of asset. Even though 
shareholders can remove any unsystematic risk by diversifying their portfolio, executives find 
that their wealth is mostly tied up with the firm and their riskiness cannot be diversified. As 
discussed earlier, CEOs are more concerned about the losses associated to risk, thus being 
16 
 
hesitant in taking much needed risk (Amihud and Lev, 1983). Furthermore, risk aversion 
behavior can reduce firm’s risk and results in reducing the wealth of shareholders. However, 
equity-based compensation to managers can overcome the managerial risk aversion and 
motivate them to engage in efficient risk-taking behavior (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
Alternatively, stock options to CEO compensation can make executives more risk averse, 
which may result in underinvestment (Ross, 2004). Hence, an optimal contract should 
motivate executives to take more risk. 
Studies in PVS show mixed results on the impact of PVS on firm risk. Akindayomi 
and Warsame (2009) argue that shareholders and executives have different goals and risk 
preferences. CEOs want to maintain and increase their incomes and reputation, which are 
linked to their firm performance. As risk and return are closely connected together (Fama, 
1976) in the sense that managers with equity-based compensation must take higher risk to 
appreciate more compensation, studies have found that such risks are actually decreasing the 
value of the firm. Sanders and Hambrick (2007) show that more option-loaded executives 
tend to pursue higher risk taking decision without thinking much about the downside risk, 
which leads them to produce big losses rather than big gains. Furthermore, the well-known 
Greenbury Report (1995) in UK points out that the share price increase might not result from 
CEO actions but reflect inflation and general market movements. 
On the other hand, Low (2009) documents strong empirical evidence for the impact of 
equity-based compensation on managers’ tendency of taking risk. The author finds evidence 
that VEGA helps align managerial risk-taking behavior with shareholders’ interest. Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2006) also find evidence of positive effect of tock return volatility on 
VEGA. They suggest that the higher executive VEGA results in riskier firm policies.  
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This study provides evidence in reducing doubts from the mixed results in the 
literature of CEO risk-taking behavior by estimating the relationship between executive’s 
incentive compensation and firm’s total risk and by examining how equity-based incentive 
can significantly help reduce the agency conflict.      
3. Hypotheses Development 
Recall that executive compensation is considered important in reducing agency 
conflicts. When both executives and shareholders hold different sets of goals and risk 
preferences, an agency problem is inherent. For CEO to work for the best interest of 
shareholders, both parties must come to an optimal contract, which potentially maximizes 
stock returns and improves firm value. Researchers (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Dow and 
Raposo, 2005; Akindayomi and Warsame, 2009) over the years have proposed that executive 
compensation, when aligned with shareholder interests, can help mitigate agency problems. 
With a potentially optimal contract, executives adjust their action strategies to maximize 
shareholder value and also increase their personal wealth through the same activities. 
Prior studies use different measures of firm performance. Bulan, Sanyal, and Yan 
(2010) argue that productivity is an important measure of firm performance and any 
improvement in it is beneficial. Michaud and Gai (2009), on the other hand, use Return on 
Equity (ROE), Average Return on Equity (Avg ROE) and Economic Value Added (EVA) to 
portray performance of firms. The authors identify EVA to be one of the most important 
components to measure firm performance as EVA shows whether the firm is adding value to 
shareholders and generating profit over cost of capital, and what assets are tied to generate 
revenue. Therefore, using different methods in measuring firm performance and executive 
compensation, researchers have tried to explain the relationship between these two variables. 
In this paper, I will measure firm performance through stock performance, operating 
performance and risk-taking to see how the relationship behaves when seen from these 
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different aspects. Therefore, the paper have three hypotheses to test the relationship between 
incentive compensation and firm performance. 
Recall that, Core and Larcker (2002) find improvement in the firm’s performance 
with the increase in the level of managerial equity ownership. They find evidence that excess 
returns increase with managerial stock ownership for firms with poor stock-price 
performance. Similarly, Larcker and Tayan (2011) disprove the myth of pay-for-performance 
and suggest that executives can generate a huge amount of wealth through stock price 
increase that they own through performance incentives. Akindayomi and Warsame (2009) 
study the relationship between firm value and executive stock option grants and find that 
future earnings increase with every dollar of granted stock options. Thus, they suggest that 
executive stock options have characteristics to bring improvement in the firm’s performance.  
Bulan, Sanyal and Yan (2010) examine the sensitivity of executive wealth with a 
percentage change in the firm’s stock price performance (Delta). They show that incentives 
for both executives and shareholders can become well aligned with an increase in delta as the 
aligned incentives will lead to higher firm productivity. While they show that the delta has 
significant influence on the productivity, they also find an adverse effect of high executive 
delta on the productivity. The adverse effects suggest that executives are reluctant to take 
more risk as the value of their portfolios becomes very sensitive to small changes in the 
firm’s stock price performance. The authors find both a positive slope region which is 
consistent with incentive alignment and a negative slope region, which signals executive risk-
aversion due to high delta. Hence, the study shows an inverse-U shaped relationship between 
executive delta and firm performance.  
Firm performance depends on executive activities, since each action of the executive 
results in an outcome driving the firm’s performance. Therefore, efficient executive decisions 
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can steer the performance of the firm in the best interest of shareholders. The connection 
between firm performance and executive activities provides executives with an option to 
ensure that the performance of the firm can reach its maximum level and it is possible to 
perform better than the industry standard. Subsequently, incentive compensation can motivate 
the executives to deliver the better performance. The idea of providing incentives to the 
executives is to motivate them to bring the firm’s performance to an optimal level. If the 
incentives are designed to be aligned with firm performance, then executives will be 
motivated to improve the firm’s performance while expecting a reward in return.  
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between incentive compensation and firm 
performance, where incentive compensation is measured by pay-performance sensitivity 
(PPS) and firm performance is measured by stock price performance. 
Similarly, studies have focused on the relationship between executive compensation 
and firm performance by measuring firm performance with operating performance. As stock 
price performance reflects the expectations by the stock market, operating performance 
provides an insight into the accounting performance of the firm. The Mehran’s (1995) results 
on firm performance suggest that Tobin’s Q and return on assets are positively related to the 
percentage of executive’s total compensation that is equity-based. Therefore, the author 
concludes that CEO incentives are affected by compensation and can have measurable 
impacts on corporate efficiency. Abowd (1990) also examines the impact of pay-performance 
sensitivity on firm performance. He finds a significant positive relationship between after-tax 
operating performance and pay-performance sensitivity. Above-median pay-performance 
sensitivity of the firm can cause higher probability of above-median future performance. 
Thus, the author argues that increasing incentive compensation can improve firm 
20 
 
performance. Lewellen et al. (1992) look at firms’ economic performance with the level of 
compensation. They find that the total compensation of a firm’s top management is positively 
related to differences in both common stock returns and operating profitability and suggest 
that incentive compensation tend to enhance the performance of a firm.  
These findings point out the importance of operating performance as another measure 
to evaluate the relation between incentive compensation and firm performance. Therefore, I 
design hypothesis 2a and 2b in order to see the relationship of PPS with firm’s operating 
performance. 
H2a: There is a positive relationship between incentive compensation and firm 
performance, where the incentive compensation is measured by pay-performance sensitivity 
(PPS) and the firm performance is measured by operating performance. 
H2b: There is a positive relationship between incentive compensation and firm 
performance, after operating performance is adjusted for industry. 
The conflict of interest between shareholders and executives arises due to the typical 
behavior of executives being risk-averse and undiversified with respect to their firm’s stock-
price performance. Equity-based compensation is introduced to mitigate the conflict and 
motivates the top management to engage in risk-taking behavior. The concerns in such 
environment are raised when executives get involved in too much risk because executives are 
rewarded for taking upside risk and are not penalized for any downside risk (Murphy, 2012). 
Murphy (2012), points out that with stock option holdings, executives gain from stock price 
increase as the stock price exceeds the exercise price, while their losses are limited to zero. 
Therefore, executives are more inclined to take excessive risk and can be encouraged to take 
on projects that deliver negative NPV. As Murphy (2012) recognizes, if a firm is an all-equity 
firm, shareholders bear both gains and losses of the firm and are not interested in any 
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investment project with negative NPV. On the other hand, if the firm is levered, equity 
holders enjoy all of the gains above obligation to bond holders, their losses are limited to the 
value of their initial equity stake. Therefore, shareholders are less concerned about too much 
risk in a levered firm. Alternatively, debtholder are concern about excessive risk as their 
assets are tied to the firm. Hence, there exists a conflict of interest between shareholders and 
debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, according to Murphy (2012), the limited 
liability feature of equity is the main reason behind creating risk-taking incentives. The idea 
of risk-taking behavior is not the main concern behind the recent controversy over executive 
compensation. Scholars are more concerned about the excessive risk-taking behavior that can 
destroy the firm value.  
Shareholders are interested in ensuring incentive for executives so that it encourages 
risk-taking behavior. Haugen and Senbet (1981) argue that executive stock option has the 
potential to encourage risk-taking behavior since any increase in stock return volatility 
increases the value of the options. Murphy (2012) also finds that the stock option value 
monotonically increases with the stock price volatility. Hence, these findings suggest that 
options can be used to provide executives with the incentive to increase volatility in stock 
returns. Bulan, Sanyal and Yan (2010) investigate the relationship between the sensitivity of 
CEO option value and stock return volatility to examine whether risk-averse executives can 
be encouraged to take on risk increasing projects since the value of the option increases with 
the firm risk. They use percentage changes in stock return volatility (VEGA) to measure the 
risk-taking incentives from the stock option grants. The authors find a positive relationship 
between risk-taking incentives and productivity, and suggest that executive VEGA increases 
firm productivity. This is consistent with the idea that stock option grants can make 
executives less concerned about the risk. 
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Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006) find evidence of positive effect of stock return 
volatility on both VEGA and Delta. Their study focuses on firm policies with executive 
compensation and finds a strong relationship suggesting that the higher executive VEGA 
results in the riskier firm policies. Low (2009) examines the executive risk-taking behavior 
with the executive VEGA as well. Low (2009) argues that if the increase in VEGA motivates 
managerial risk-taking, then firms with low executive VEGA should have a large reduction in 
firm risk. That is high VEGA helps offset the risk aversion behavior of executives towards 
risky projects. The author finds evidence that increased VEGA helps align managerial risk-
taking behavior with shareholders’ interest. 
Adding the idea of increasing stock return volatility into the value of option holding, I 
design hypotheses 3 to capture the relation between executive incentives and risk taking 
activities.    
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is: 
H3: There is a positive relationship between incentive compensation and risk taking, 
where incentive compensation is measured by pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS). 
4. Data and Sample Pattern 
4.1 Data 
The compensation data of this study are obtained from the Execucomp database. The 
sample period ranges from the year 1992 to 2013. Starting with firms in the Execucomp 
database, I augment the data by merging it with CRSP and Compustat. The process creates a 
sample with 2,788 unique firms during 1992 to 2013.  
To compute the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and pay-volatility sensitivity 
(PVS), I use COPEROL and YEAR as key unique identifiers. COPEROL identifies each 
executive and YEAR identifies the period of executive holding the CEO position. By 
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selecting only CEO data from Executive dataset, I obtain 2,788 unique firms. The Accounting 
changes imposed by Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the required 
compensation discloser mandated by Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) made 
Execucomp to change its compensation data reporting standards in order to align with the 
changes. Therefore, during initial data screening, pre-2006 and post-2006 information are 
identified for separate PPS and PVS estimation. Using the information from Execucomp 
dataset, I merge the sample dataset into both Compustat and CRSP databases. From 
Compustat, I gather annual information about Total Asset (AT, item#6), Earnings Before 
Depreciation (EBITDA, item#13) and Book Value Per Share (BKVLPS, item#10) from year 
1992 to 2013. These variables are used to compute the operating performance of the firm to 
test Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b and to calculate the Book-to-market ratio of the Fama-
French three factor model. Finally, the monthly stock prices for the same period are collected 
from CRSP and merged with the sample data.  
The descriptive statistics of the variables are shown in Table 1. Panel A shows the 
descriptive statistics for analyzing stock performance on pay-performance sensitivity. The 
dependent variable, excess return, has a mean of 0.155 with a standard deviation of 0.666. 
My main variable, log PPS, has a mean of 3.885 with standard deviation of 1.798. To 
estimate the relationship between stock price performance and PPS, I use 151,343 
observations ranging from 1992 to 2013. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics related to 
my second hypothesis. The firm performance measures, ROA and industry adjusted ROA, 
have mean values of 0.125 and 0.0044 with standard deviation values of 0.116 and 0.113, 
respectively. Log PPS has almost the same figures as Panel A. The mean of log PPS in Panel 
B is 3.912 with its standard deviation of 1.792. Finally, Panel C of Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the third model which tests the relationship between risk taking and 
pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS). The total number of observation for this model is 147,778. 
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The mean and standard deviation for incentive measure (PVS) are 59.471 and 165.86, 
respectively.  
Table 2 presents correlations between key variables. The correlation between excess 
return and PPS is positive at 0.029. For operating performance, the correlation between ROA 
and PPS is positive with a value of 0.02. Similarly, the industry adjusted operating 
performance has positive correlation with PPS at 0.033. However, both risk taking-1 and risk 
taking-2 have negative correlation with PVS.    
Table 3 shows the distribution of all the industries that are in the sample data. I use 
the SIC code to classify the data into different industries. In the sample of 2788 unique firms, 
I have firms from every industry ranging from Agricultural to Conglomerate in Execucomp. 
The biggest proportion of my sample comes from the industrial manufacturing sector. It is 
26.2% of the entire sample. Agricultural and conglomerate constitute the lowest fraction of 
the data sample (0.4% and 0.3% respectively). Subsequently, 15.5% of my data sample is 
from the financial service industry. Overall, the entire sample covers a wide range of industry 
sectors, which provides assurance that the sample firms for the analysis reflect the 
representative image of the population.   
4.2 Sample Pattern 
Table 4 reports excess returns by firm sizes, book-to-market rations and PPS. Panel A 
shows average excess returns, which are sorted firms into two size groups and independently 
sorted firms into three BM groups. Since the sample size is reduced by sorting, it is not good 
to use the Fama-French breakpoints for benchmark. I use my dataset to identify breakpoints 
and allocate stocks according to its group. To do this, I follow the same methodology as in 
Fama and French (1993).  
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In Panel A, average excess returns typically fall from small stocks to big stocks (Size 
effect). The low BM column is the only exception. However, the value effect which is the 
relation between average excess returns and BM ratios, appears much more consistent. The 
excess returns increase with the BM ratio.  It is noted that the value effect is strongest among 
small stocks, as average excess return rises from -0.0107 to 0.6725. 
In Panel B of Table 4, displays average excess returns, which are independently 
sorted by Size and pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). The panel demonstrates patterns 
similar to Size-BM. While the average excess returns increase in firm size from 0.0329 to 
0.0875 for the low BM column, the average excess returns decrease from 0.2111 to 0.1557 
for medium BM, and from 0.2662 to 0.2278 for high BM, as the firm size increases. It 
appears that, for all size groups, average excess returns increase as PPS increases. In small 
firms, the average excess returns increase from 0.0329 to 0.2662 as PPS increases. This 
pattern is preserved for large firms as average excess returns increase from 0.0875 to 0.2278. 
Therefore, executives with higher pay-performance sensitivity tend to deliver higher excess 
returns.     
5. Methodology 
The methodology is broken down into two parts. First, I describe the method used to 
compute the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and the pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS). 
Second, I present the regression models used to examine the relation between firm 
performance and executive compensation.    
5.1 Pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) 
 To formulate PPS and PVS, I closely follow the methodology of Daniel, Li and 
Naveen (2013) which in turn follows Core and Guay (2002), and the Black-Scholes (1973) 
option valuation model modified by Merton (1973) to include firm dividends.  
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The option value based on the Black-Scholes (1973) formula for European call option 
modified for dividend payout by Merton (1973) is given as  
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Due to the change in the reporting format by Execucomp, the incentive calculation is 
divided into two parts, pre-2006 and post-2006. Moreover, the calculations are further 
divided into two parts based on exercisable option and unexercisable options. To compute the 
incentive compensation provided by stock potions, I use variables defined in Table 5.   
Following the Daniel, Li and Naveen (2013), I estimate for the maturity dates using 
the option expiration date and fiscal year-end date, and Dividend Yield post 2006. For 
volatility measures, I need to calculate the BS-volatility post-2006 since Execucomp stopped 
providing this variable in 2006.  I follow the Execucomp methodology closely for estimating 
post-2006 volatility. I use the annualized standard deviation of stock returns rolling over 60 
months prior to the fiscal period. Risk-free rates are collected from the Federal Reserve1 
                                                          
1 The risk-free rate was pulled from the Federal Reserve’ website. 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm 
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corresponding to the maturity of options. The rates are converted from percentage to fit in the 
Black-Scholes model by dividing them by 100. Once all the variables are estimated, I finally 
compute pay-performance sensitivity and pay-volatility sensitivity using the methodologies 
described in the following sections.  
5.1.1 Pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) 
Pay-performance sensitivity is defined as the “Dollar change in wealth associated 
with a 1% change in the firm’s stock price” (Daniel et al., 2013 and Core and Guay, 2002). 
PPS measures the wealth change of CEOs with respect to the percentage change in the firm’s 
stock price performance. Therefore, it captures the incentives provided to executives, whose 
activities increase the firm performance.   
By utilizing the Black-Scholes-Merton model, I estimate the pay-performance 
sensitivity (respect to 1% change in stock price) as: 
     
price price
 wealth change / price *  [ *(#option holding) #shr.own]* 
100 100
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where #shr.own = Number of shares owned by the CEO. 
5.1.2 Pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) 
Pay-volatility sensitivity is defined as the “Dollar change in wealth associated with 
0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns” (Daniel et al., 2013 and 
Core and Guay, 2002). PVS measures the wealth change of executive’s wealth with respect to 
the change in the firm’s return volatilities. Since the value of stock option increases with the 
stock return volatilities, the equity-based executive compensation provides incentives for 
executives to increase such volatilities (Murphy 2012). Therefore, PVS captures the 
incentives provided to executives, whose activities increase the stock return volatilities. 
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Adopting the Black-Scholes-Merton model, I estimate the pay-volatility sensitivity 
(respect to 0.01 change in stock return volatility) as: 
       
1
2  /  *(0.01)  * 0.01 ,dToptionvalue stock volatility e N Z ST       
Where   .N normal density function    
Computing pay-performance sensitivity and pay-volatility sensitivity, I take natural 
log of PPS to make it compatible for the Fama-French 3 Factor model and other regression 
models. 
5.2 Fama-French Three Factor Model and Regressions Estimation 
I run multiple regressions to test different hypotheses. To test Hypothesis-1, I use the 
Fama-French Three Factor model to examine the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm’s stock price performance. For testing the remaining hypotheses, I 
perform regression estimation with different control variables and dependent variables in 
order to investigate the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance: 
stock price performance and operating performance.     
5.2.1 Fama-French Three Factor Model 
For the Fama French 3 factor model, I compute the dependent variable to test the 
Hypothesis-1. Measuring the firm performance through stock price performance requires 
estimation of the stock returns to each firm in my sample. As PPS and PVS are estimated 
annually, the stock price performance needs to be measured annually as well. Therefore, I 
compound the monthly stock returns to annualize stock returns as 
[(1 )*(1 )*....*(1 )] 1compounded return Jan Feb Dec      
The Fama-French 3 factor model considers three unique independent variables that 
take into account the market factor (market return minus the risk-free rate), the size factor 
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(small minus big) and the value factor (high minus low). I estimate these three factors 
according to Fama and French (1993). The market factor is estimated by gathering the 
“value-weighed market returns” of each period and then subtracting the risk-free rate from 
the returns. While collecting value-weighted market returns, I ensure to incorporate the 
dividend factor into the returns. The market factor is then annualized to fit in the model with 
PPS and annual stock price performance.   
To calculate the size factor, the data are rearranged based on each firm’s assets to 
reflect the firm size. For each year, firms are divided into two parts “small” and “big” based 
on their market equity value. Then each size factor is categorized into three parts, low, 
medium and high. The lowest 30% of all the small firms are assigned as “small low”, the 
small firms with assets between 30% and 70% are assigned “small medium”. The highest 
30% of all the small firms are assigned “small high”. A similar category is used for the big 
firms. Then “small minus big (smb)” is calculated using the following formula, 
1 1
 *[ ] *[ ] 
3 3
smb small low small medium small high big low big medium big high       
 To estimate the “value factor”, the book to market (B/M) ratios are calculated using 
book value per share. The data are then rearranged based on the firm’s B/M ratio to reflect 
the firm value. For every year, firms are distributed into two groups “high” and “low” based 
on their B/M values. In addition, each group is further divided into two groups: small and big. 
The group “high small” is assigned to the set of the high B/M ratio with lowest 30% of firm 
value. Also, the group with highest 30% of firm value in the high B/M ratio is assigned “high 
big”. The same process is applied to low firms. Therefore, I obtain two groups for each of the 
tree “value factor” based on top and bottom 30% from the set. Finally, I estimate the quantity 
“high minus low (hml)” using the following expression, 
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Once all the factors are estimated, I setup the Fama-French regression model by 
taking the annualized return as the dependent variable and the log of PPS as one of the 
independent variables to test Hypothesis-1. The Fama-French Regression is conducted to 
examine the relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and stock returns.  
5.2.2 Regression Estimation 
To test Hypothesis 1, I run multiple regressions with variables that are different from 
those in the Fama-French model. The accounting variables are formed using information 
from the Compustat database. While the incentive measure (PPS) remains the same as in the 
Fama-French three factor model, the total cash compensation (TCC) includes both salary and 
bonus. I use stock price and book value of stockholder’s equity to calculate book-to-market 
(BM). For market capitalization, I use market value of firm’s equity from CRSP at the end of 
calendar years. The model also includes one year lag of returns and three year lag of returns 
for each firm. Lastly, I compute the asset growth as one year percentage change in total 
assets. All the variables are estimated annually to match with the incentive (PPS) estimation. 
Once all the variables are computed, I perform two sets of regressions. One set has stock 
returns regressed on PPS and other variables measured as of the same year. The other set has 
stock returns of the following year regressed on lagged PPS and other variables measured as 
of the same year.  
To test hypotheses 2a and 2b, I estimate the operating performance (ROA) measure of 
firms by using earnings before interest, EBITDA (Compustat data item # 13) and year-end 
total assets (Compustat data item # 13). Return on assets (ROA) is computed by taking the 
ratio of EBITDA over total assets. To examine the relationship between incentive 
compensation and firm’s operating performance, I replace stock returns with return on assets 
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(ROA) measured as of the fiscal year end matched with the same calendar year and regress 
ROA on PPS and cash compensation with control variables measured as of the same year. 
Furthermore, I classify the ROA into different industries and then subtract the industry 
median to adjust for the industry effects. Later, I replace the operating performance with 
industry adjusted operating performance and examine the relationship between incentive 
compensation and industry adjusted operating performance to test Hypothesis 2b.  
In addition, I estimate the model for both operating performance and industry adjusted 
operating performance by regressing on the lagged values of all the variables. Therefore, one-
year-forward operating performance measured in the following calendar year is regressed on 
lagged PPS and cash compensation with control variables measured as of the current year. 
The results of this regression are shown in Table 10. 
While the study has used pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) as the incentive measure 
of executives so far, I move to the pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) measure to test Hypothesis 
3. It is well known that the value of stock option increases with stock return volatility 
(Murphy 2012). Therefore, executives are motivated to take more risk if their compensation 
package includes rewards to volatility. Low (2009) argues that firms tend to reduce 
executive’s risk aversion behavior by increasing PVS. Thus, I examine the relationship 
between executive’s PVS and firm total risk.  To test Hypothesis 3, I use two different risk 
taking measures. Risk taking 1 is the log variance of daily stock returns over annualized fiscal 
year (Low, 2009 and Coles et al., 2006) and risk taking 2 is the standard deviation of return 
on assets (John et al., 2008). As control variables, I use total asset (size) to control for size, 
return on assets (ROA) to control for profitability, market-to-book (MB) as a proxy for 
investment opportunity, and total cash compensation (TCC) as a proxy for the level of 
executive’s risk aversion. Coles et al. (2006) show that executives can change the firm risk 
through leverage, capital expenditures, and research and development expenditures. 
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Therefore, any changes to these firm policies can induce firm’s risk change through reasons 
other than manager’s risk aversion (Low, 2009). Hence, I also control for firm policy through 
Net Capital Expenditure (NETCAPEX), Leverage and R&D Expenditure (RD).  
6. Results  
To examine the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance, I 
conduct multiple tests with various proxies and control variables because I am interested in 
the relationship between different aspects of incentive compensation and firm performance. I 
begin the analysis using a sample of 2,788 unique firms with all available information needed 
to perform the tests. The time period includes the entire database period of Execucomp: 1992 
– 2013. Once I collect all the information for my sample, I conduct a series of multiple 
regressions to determine the relationship between incentive compensation and firm 
performance. For each hypothesis, I change my dependent and independent variables 
according to the tests.  
6.1 The relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and firm’s stock performance 
  The first regression set to test this relationship involves the Fama-French three factor 
model. I regress annualized stock return on the pay-performance sensitivity and three Fama-
French factors. The econometric models are as follows: 
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The results for these estimations are presented in Table 6. Eq. (1) is the Fama-French 
three factor model with PPS as an additional variable. Column 2 of Table 6 represents this 
equation. The coefficient on Log PPS in the Fama-French model is positive and significant (p 
< 0.001) as 0.0473. Eq. (2) replaces Log PPS with average of Log PPS and one-period-lag of 
Log PPS, and eq. (3) replaces Log PPS with average of Log PPS, one-period-lag of Log PPS 
and two-period-lag of Log PPS. The coefficient of executive incentives in eq. (2) is 0.0523 
and in eq. (3) is 0.05. It is noted that both coefficients are significant and very close to each 
other. In eq. (4), one-period-lag of Log PPS and two-period-lag of Log PPS are regressed 
with excess returns. The coefficient of one-period-lag of Log PPS is 0.01349, which is 
significant (p<0.001), while the coefficient of two-period-lag of Log PPS is -0.00953, which 
is also significant (p<0.001). However, in column 4 of Table 6, the coefficient of the average 
executive incentive over two periods of lag is positive and significant. Therefore, these 
results show a positive relationship between excess returns and executives’ pay-performance 
sensitivity, implying that as executives are compensated more from stock options and stock 
grants, their firms experience higher stock price performance.  
 To further test the relationship between stock price performance and incentive 
compensation, I run additional regressions using different control variables. I replace the 
Fama-French three factors with Total Cash Compensation, Firm Market Capitalization, 
Book-to-Market ratio, Lag 1 year and Lag 2 years of returns, and Assets growth. The 
econometric model is as follows: 
1 1 2 2it it it it it it it it it it it it it it iit tf t ip pps t ttc f fmc b bm r a agR R r e                   (5) 
For eq. (5), I run a series of regressions, which are presented in Table 7. Column 3 
examines the relationship between excess returns and incentive compensation, with total cash 
compensation as control variables. The coefficient of Log PPS, 0.0665, is significant (p < 
34 
 
0.001). As more control variables are added to the model, the adjusted R-square improves 
from 0.024 (column 3) to 0.633 (column 5). Finally, the regression for eq. (5) presents a 
significant positive coefficient of Log PPS with a magnitude of 0.01939. To further assure the 
results obtained for testing Hypothesis-1, I regress the above variables on one-year-forward 
stock price performance. The results are shown in Table 8 and the econometric model is as 
follows: 
1 1 2 21 it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it iit f tp pps t ttc f fmc b bm r r a agR eR                     (6) 
The results of eq. (6) are similar to those of eq. (5). For every regression in Table 8, 
the coefficient of Log PPS is positive and significant. In column 5 regression, the relationship 
of Log PPS with one-year-forward excess returns is positive and significant with the 
coefficient of 0.00916 (p < 0.001). These findings contradict the findings of Cooper, Gulen 
and Rau (2014) but are aligned with the findings of the one-year-forward empirical model of 
Akindayomi and Warame (2009). Therefore, my results of positive loading on the coefficient 
of pay-performance sensitivity on all of the above equations imply that there is a positive 
relationship between incentive compensation and firm performance, where incentive 
compensation is measured by pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and firm performance is 
measured by stock price performance. Hypothesis-1 is supported. 
6.2 The relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and firm’s operating 
performance 
In Hypothesis 1, I look at the relationship between executive compensation and firm 
performance by using stock price performance as firm performance measure. Hypotheses 2a 
and 2b consider firm performance through operating performance. I measure firm’s operating 
performance by return on asset (ROA) which is the ratio of earnings before depreciation over 
total assets. For Hypothesis-2b, I adjust operating performance for industry effects to 
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examine a much refined effects of executive incentives. Computing the operating 
performance, I execute two separate regressions for each hypothesis. The results are shown in 
Table 9 and Table 10.  
Table 9 presents two regressions; one for ROA and the other for industry adjusted 
ROA. I measure firm’s operating performance as of fiscal year t regressed on lagged ROA as 
of t-1 and on incentive compensation and other variables as of year t. The econometric 
models are as follows: 
1 1 1 1 2 2it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it itt ti ip pps t ttc roa f fmc b bm r rR a ag eOA                    (7) 
1 1 1 1 2 2it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it iit t itp pps t ttc roa f fAdjR mc b bm r rA a eO ag                 (8) 
The coefficients α1 of Log PPS for both equations are positively significant (p <0.001 
for eq. (7) and p < 0.001 for eq. (8), suggesting a positive relationship between incentive 
compensation and firm’s operating performance. The second regression shows a Log PPS 
coefficient of 0.00052. In eq. (7) (3rd regression), I control for total cash compensation 
(TCC) and find that the coefficient of Log PPS is 0.00064 (p < 0.001). A similar result is 
obtained when the operating performance is adjusted for industry. On the other hand, even 
though total cash compensation is negatively related to operating performance, the 
relationship between incentive compensation and operating performance becomes positive 
and significant after operating performance is adjusted for industry. The adjusted R-square 
for this model is 0.8777 for ROA and 0.7744 for industry adjusted ROA.  
To test Hypothesis 2a and 2b further, I analyze the relationship of executive incentive 
with one-year-forward ROA and industry-adjusted ROA. Table 10 represents two sets of 
regression; one for ROA and the other for industry-adjusted ROA. It presents one-year-
forward firm operating performance as of fiscal year t+1 regressed on lagged ROA, and on 
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incentive compensation and other variables as of year t. The econometric models are as 
follows: 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it iti it tp pps t ttc roa f fmc b bm r r a aO gR eA                  (9) 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2it it it it it it it itit it it it it it it it it it itp pps t ttc roa f fmc b bm r r a aAdjR gOA e                   (10) 
The results of one-year-forward model is also similar to the previous model. The 
coefficient of pay-performance sensitivity is positively related to both operating performance 
and industry adjusted operating performance. Moreover, Log PPS is positive even after 
controlling for TCC. While these results contradict the literature of no pay-for-performance, 
they are consistent with the findings of Abowd (1990) and Mehran (1995). The results imply 
that there is a positive relationship between incentive compensation and firm performance, 
where incentive compensation is measured by pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and firm 
performance are measured by both operating performance and industry adjusted operating 
performance. Hence, Hypotheses 2a and 2b are both supported. It appears that there is a 
positive relationship between incentive compensation and firm performance.   
6.3 The relationship between pay-volatility sensitivity and firm’s risk taking 
The literature on managerial risk taking examines the relationship between incentive 
compensation and stock return volatility. In Hypothesis 3, I change the incentive measure of 
executive compensation from PPS to pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) and replace firm 
performance with firm’s risk taking. I regress the risk taking measures on PVS, Firm Policy 
variables and lagged control variables to test the hypothesis. The results are presented in 
Table 11 with the economic models are as follows: 
          1 11 it it it it it it it it itit itp pvs t ttc c contrRis ol f firm ick pol y e                          (11) 
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1 12 it it it it it it it it itit itp pvs t ttc c contrRis ol f firm ick pol y e                          (12) 
The results of Eq. (11) and Eq. (12) are similar to each other. The coefficients for both 
equations show that PVS is positively related to risk taking, even though each risk taking is 
measured differently. The prior research shows the importance of controlling for firm policy 
in examining the relationship between risk taking and pay-performance volatility (Coles et 
al., 2006). The first regression without controlling for any firm policy has the coefficient of 
pay-volatility sensitivity as 0.00012 (p < 0.001). Controlling for firm policy variables, the 
coefficient of pay-volatility sensitivity remains positive with the increased adjusted R-square 
from 0.1917 to 0.2179. With risk taking 2, I run a similar regression model as presented in 
Table 11. With each of the two regression equations, I have a positive coefficient for PVS, 
but the magnitudes of the coefficient differ noticeably. The results are consistent with the 
findings by Low (2009) and Coles et al., (2006). My findings of positive loading on the 
coefficient of pay-volatility sensitivity with the risk taking models imply that there is a 
positive relationship between incentive compensation and risk taking, where incentive 
compensation is measured by pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS). Hence, Hypothesis 3 is 
supported. 
6.4 Robustness 
Endogeneity has been an issue for empirical research as estimates derive from 
OLS/panel regression in many cases are unreliable. One of the major causes of endogeneity is 
an omitted variable issue. This occurs when some variables that can have a significant 
influence on independent and dependent variables are not included in the model. As Brown, 
Beekes and Verhoeven (2011) argue, the most common way to address endogeneity is to use 
instrumental variables. Therefore, to test the reliability of my results, I perform simultaneous 
equation modeling (three-stage least square) with executive age and firm size as instrumental 
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variables. Executive age can affect CEOs in their decision on firm performance and risk-
taking as they become more knowledgeable over time. The experience they gain over time 
will help them make better decisions and improve firm performance. In terms of  firm size, it 
has been recognized that large firms tend to have lower PPS than small firms. Therefore, firm 
size can have a significant role in explaining incentive compensation. In this three-stage least 
square approach, the 1st step predicts the values for the endogenous regressors followed by 
stage two, where residuals are obtained to estimates the cross equation correlation matrix. 
Finally, in the 3rd stage the model conducts the estimation step. The economic models are as 
follows: 
1 1 2 2it it it it it it it it it it it it it tf iit p pps t tcc f fmc r r a age eR R                       (13) 
1 1( )it it it f it it it it it it i it itit tR R t tcc f fmc r s size epps                   (14) 
1 1 2 2 1 1it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it itit p pps t tcc f fmc r r a age b bm roa eROA                        (15) 
1 1 1 1it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it iit tp ROA t tcc f fmc r s size b bm rops a e                    (16) 
The results of simultaneous equation modeling are shown in Table 12. In the first set 
of results, where firm performance is measured through stock price performance, I find 
excess returns to be positively related to PPS. The coefficient of PPS is significant (p<0.001) 
at 0.104. The Weighted R-square of modeling is 0.5295. Moreover, when firm performance is 
measured through operating performance, the coefficient of PPS in that model is also found 
to be positive as 0.011. The relationship between ROA and PPS in this model is also 
significant (p < 0.001) and the weighted R-square of the model is 0.8388. The results of the 
three-stage least squares (3SLS) show a positive significant coefficient for pay-performance 
sensitivity with both firm performance measures. The results from simultaneous equations 
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strengthen that there is a positive relationship between incentive compensation and firm 
performance, supporting the equity-based compensation to executives.  
6.5 What explains the positive relationship between incentive compensation and firm 
performance? 
Using various measures in executive compensation and in firm performance, I have 
found a positive relationship between incentive compensation and firm performance during 
my sample period. Equity-based compensation became extremely popular in 1990s and 
accounted for about 45% of the executive’s entire compensation package by 1995 (Langsam, 
Kreuze and Newell, 1997). The increase in equity-based compensation provide executives an 
opportunity to increase their wealth by increasing stock price performance. Furthermore, as 
Murphy (2012) argues, while researchers regressing grant date pay levels on performance 
find no pay-for-performance, they find that the realized pay of executives is strongly related 
to firm performance. The realized pay (by definition) depends on the firm’s current and past 
performance. Therefore, it is the most useful measure in evaluating whether rewards have 
been aligned with firm performance. Moreover, the positive relationship between incentive 
compensation and firm performance is expected since equity-based compensation provides 
incentives to executives better than salary and bonus. Therefore, even a small percentage 
increase in firm’s stock price will provide executives sufficient incentive to work harder and 
to increase their wealth (Larcker and Tayan, 2011).       
The positive relationship between PVS and risk taking is explained by Murphy (2012) 
with the idea of increasing the value of options by increasing stock return volatility. 
Therefore, if the increase in volatility results in increase in option values, PVS provides an 
incentive to the executives to increase such volatilities by taking more risk. Therefore, the 
higher PVS encourages executives to take more risk, as it reduces executive’s risk aversion 
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behavior. Executives take more risk because they have an opportunity to increase their wealth 
through appreciation of equity-based compensation if they are more open to risk taking.  
7. Conclusion  
Executive compensation continues to be one of the most debated topics in finance 
research. However, the practice in CEO compensation during the past few decades raises 
concerns about its efficacy. Even though equity-based compensation tends to increase the 
CEO pay over time, researchers still argue about the effectiveness of incentive compensation 
in improving firm’s stock price, operating performance, and/or firm’s risk takings. The 
objective of this study is to examine whether the incentive compensation improves firm 
performance. The results provide evidence to the literature that the equity-based 
compensation helps align the interest of managers to that of shareholder as mangers become 
motivated with the opportunity to increase their wealth through firm performance 
improvements.  
Using Execucomp database, this study finds that the incentive compensation 
measured by pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) is positively associated with firm 
performance measured by stock price and operating performance. Furthermore, the paper also 
finds that the incentive compensation measured by pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) is 
positively associated with firm’s total risk taking. In addition to the positive relationship 
between incentive compensation and firm performance, it is also found that executives with 
higher PPS tend to increase firm performance both in stock prices and in earning from 
operation.   
This study contributes to the executive compensation literature by first examining 
whether managerial incentives provided by equity-based compensation improve stock price 
performance and/or operating performance. While most studies in the literature focus on 
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executive compensation as a whole or as individual components of firm performance, I 
investigate the direct relation between pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) and firm 
performance and between pay-volatility sensitivities (PVS) and risk taking. Second, although 
information on managers’ PPS is publicly available and must have been reflected into stock 
prices in efficient capital markets, I find that managers with higher PPS increase firm 
performance both in stock prices and in earnings from operation. Third, while managers in 
the modern corporations have little share-ownership into their firms, agency conflicts 
between shareholders and managers can be significantly reduced by granting equity-based 
compensation to mangers. Hence, the current trend toward a high level of executive 
compensation provided mostly by equity-based compensations might be a natural practice 
among corporations. 
Overall, the findings of this study support the rationale of equity-based compensation 
to the executive, as it provides an opportunity for executives to increase their wealth by 
aligning their interests with those of shareholder.   
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Appendix 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A Stock Performance on Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
Variable n Mean St.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Excess Return 151343 0.155 0.666 -1.037 -0.156 0.082 0.339 26.147 
PPS 151343 3.885 1.798 -79.342 2.791 3.876 4.991 13.472 
HML 151343 3.159 15.954 -39.40 -3.46 3.71 15.14 27.24 
SMB 151343 3.298 11.816 -23.29 -3.73 0.39 7.78 28.41 
Mkt_Rf 151343 8.151 18.879 -38.39 0.83 10.69 20.21 35.15 
 
Panel B Operating Performance on Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
Variable n Mean St.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
ROA 156108 0.125 0.116 -2.989 0.072 0.125 0.180 1.388 
Adjusted ROA 156108 0.0044 0.113 -3.125 -0.035 0.0002 0.048 1.237 
PPS 156108 3.912 1.792 -79.342 2.813 3.904 5.013 13.472 
TCC 156108 6.216 0.796 -6.907 5.720 6.140 6.636 11.706 
Returns 156108 0.188 0.655 -0.986 0.113 0.113 0.369 26.19 
Market 
Capitalization 
156108 21.135 1.645 13.764 
 
20.004 21.004 22.182 27.156 
BM 156108 -0.635 41.139 -5310.7 0.00687 0.015 0.033 601.67 
Asset Growth 156108 0.374 9.106 -0.991 -0.021 0.057 0.171 1930.0 
 
Panel C Risk Taking on Pay-Volatility Sensitivity 
Variable n Mean St.Dev. Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Risk Taking-1 147778 -7.452 0.951 -10.759 -8.127 -7.503 -6.823 -2.741 
Risk Taking-2 147778 0.039 0.074 0.0001 0.012 0.024 0.045 11.03 
PVS 147778 59.471 165.68 0.00001 6.152 17.657 50.705 1251.34 
TCC 147778 6.214 0.788 -6.91 5.72 6.143 6.64 11.7 
Total Assets 147778 14128 78662 3.432 509.29 1644.621 5932 3221972 
Market 
Capitalization 
147778 1.981 1.721 0.298 1.139 1.493 2.195 78.564 
RD 147778 0.031 0.065 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.033 1.545 
NetCapex 147778 0.052 0.062 -1.420 0.014 0.036 0.069 1.008 
Leverage 147778 0.221 0.193 0.00 0.006 0.020 0.329 4.910 
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Table 2: Sample correlations of key variables of multivariate analysis  
 Exce
ss 
Retur
n 
RO
A 
Ind_Adj_R
OA 
Risk 
Takin
g-1 
Risk 
Takin
g-2 
PPS PVS TC
C 
RD Levera
ge 
Net 
Cape
x 
Excess 
Return 
1           
ROA 0.089 1          
Ind_Adj_R
OA 
0.087 0.94
8 
1         
Risk 
Taking-1 
0.019 -
0.18
4 
-0.238 1        
Risk 
Taking-2 
0.049 -
0.09
4 
-0.123 0.227 1       
PPS 0.029 . 2
7 
0.033 0.005 0.001 1      
PVS -
0.009 
0.05
3 
0.063 -0.097 -0.031 0.21
1 
1     
TCC . 1  0.04
4 
0.081 -.105 -0.053 0.04
5 
0.32
5 
1    
RD 0.025 -
0.28
7 
-0.349 0.277 0.225 0.01
1 
0.00
3 
-
0.08
5 
1   
Leverage -
0.065 
-
0.08
9 
-0.108 -0.052 -0.032 -
0.02
2 
0.00
4 
. 7
4 
-
0.1
6 
1  
NetCapex -
0.002 
.1
5 
0.105 0.080 0.046 . 1
1 
-
0.04
2 
-
0.02
5 
-
0.0
2 
0.056 1 
 
Table 3: Sample Distribution by 1-digit SIC industry 
SIC Industry Number (%) 
0 Agricultural 11 0.4% 
1 Mining and Exploration 144 5.2% 
2 Dairy, Livestock and Chemicals 394 14.1% 
3 Industrial Manufacturing 731 26.2% 
4 Transportation, Communication and Waste Management 294 10.5% 
5 Wholesale and Retail Stores 303 10.9% 
6 Financial Services 433 15.5% 
7 Other Services 351 12.6% 
8 Health and Education 118 4.2% 
9 Conglomerate 9 0.3% 
Total: 2788 100% 
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Table 4: Size, BM and pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) patterns in excess returns 
Average annual excess returns for portfolios formed on Size and BM, Size and PPS; sample is from 1992 to 2013. 
Stocks are allocated to two Size groups (Small and Big) using the sample breakpoints (50-percentile). Stocks are 
further allocated independently to three BM groups (Low, Medium and High), again using our own breakpoints 
(30-percentile and 70-percentile).  Panel A represents Size-BM portfolios. Similarly, Panel B shows Size-PPS 
portfolios. Instead of allocating stocks independently to three BM groups, stocks are allocated into three PPS 
groups. The table shows average of annual excess return.  
 Low Medium High 
Panel A: Size-BM Portfolios  
Small -0.0107 0.2367 0.6725 
Big 0.0059 0.0958 0.3116 
Panel B: Size-PPS Portfolios 
Small 0.0329 0.2111 0.2662 
Big 0.0875 0.1557 0.2278 
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Table 5: Variable Definitions 
The table shows the definition of variables that are used in the regressions as control variables and firm policy 
variables and in the estimation of pay-performance sensitivity and pay-volatility sensitivity.  
Panel A: Variable Definitions for PPS and PVS estimation 
Estimation Variables Definition 
Option Exercisable and Option 
Unexercisable  
Number of vested and unvested options awards 
Expric Option Exercise Price 
Exdate Option Expiration Date 
Price (PRCCF) Year End Close Price of Stock 
Volatility Estimate Stock Volatility (60 months rolling) 
Dividend Estimated Dividend Yield. Average of dividend 
yield over the current and two prior years, 
winsorized to 5th and 95th levels. 
Risk Free Rate Fiscal year end risk free rate corresponding to 
maturity of the options. Historical data from 
Federal Reserve. 
 
Panel B: Variable Definitions for Regression 
Control Variables Definition 
Asset Growth (Assetst – Assetst-1) / Assetst-1 
Size Log (Total Assets) t-1 
MB ((Total assets – Common Equity) + (Price Fiscal 
Year Close* Common Shares Outstanding)) / 
Total Assets) t-1 
ROA Operating income before depreciation / Total 
Assets 
Leverage  ((Debt in Current Liabilities + Long Term Debt 
Total) / Total Assets) t 
NetCapex ((Capital Expenditure – Sale of Property, Plant 
and Equipment) / Total Assets) t  
 RD (Research and Development Expense / Total 
Assets) t 
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Table 6: Three-Factor Regression of Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Firm’s Excess Returns 
it it it it it it it it itf itit mkt s smb h hml p pps eR R        
Dependent variable is the annual excess return regressed on the Fama-French market factor (Mkt-Rf), value 
factor (HML), size factor (SMB) and on pay-performance sensitivity (PPS). PPS is also lagged for one year (Lag-
1 log PPS) and two years (Lag-2 log PPS). Lag-1 Avg PPS is the average of PPS and one-year lag PPS, whereas, 
Lag-2 Avg PPS is the average of PPS, one-year lag PPS and two-year lag PPS. The sample is from 1992 to 2013 
and the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Excess 
Returns 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lag-2 Log 
PPS 
    -0.00953*** 
(-8.25) 
Lag-1 Log 
PPS 
    0.01349*** 
(11.28) 
Lag-2 Avg 
PPS 
   0.05000*** 
(43.30) 
 
Lag-1 Avg 
PPS 
  0.05239*** 
(49.82) 
  
Log PPS  0.04732*** 
(52.44) 
  0.04605*** 
(39.87) 
HML 0.00201*** 
(17.65) 
0.00199*** 
(17.64) 
0.00198*** 
(17.16) 
0.00197*** 
(16.68) 
0.00191*** 
(16.25) 
SMB 0.00545*** 
(35.41) 
0.00528*** 
(34.57) 
0.00526*** 
(34.28) 
0.00528*** 
(34.01) 
0.00527*** 
(34.10) 
Mkt-Rf 0.00932*** 
(106.79) 
0.00913*** 
(105.57) 
0.00918*** 
(105.49) 
0.00924*** 
(105.13) 
0.00911*** 
(103.92) 
Constant 0.05560*** 
(30.30) 
-0.12615*** 
(-32.23) 
-0.14669*** 
(-32.87) 
-0.13850*** 
(-28.40) 
-0.1372*** 
(-28.21) 
Obs 151343 151343 147724 142010 142010 
Adj R2 0.0890 0.1052 0.1051 0.1036 0.1094 
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Table 7: Regression of Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Firm’s Excess Returns 
1 1 2 2it it it it it it it it it it it it it it iit tf t ip pps t ttc f fmc b bm r a agR R r e              
Dependent variable, annual excess returns measured over January-December of calendar year t, is regressed on 
incentive compensation and other variables measured as of year t. Incentive compensation is measured through pay-
performance sensitivity and cash compensation is the total cash compensation (TTC) collected from Execucomp. 
Explanatory variables include one year and three years lag of stock returns, asset growth, market capitalization and BM 
ratio (Book-to-market ratio defined by Fama-French three factor model (1996)). The sample is from 1992 to 2013 and 
the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Excess Returns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log-PPS 0.05166*** 
(56.30) 
 0.06652*** 
(61.31) 
0.06662*** 
(57.01) 
0.01939*** 
(24.51) 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
 0.01798*** 
(8.62) 
-0.06238*** 
(-25.53) 
-0.06115*** 
(-23.92) 
-0.01813*** 
-10.86) 
Firm Market 
Capitalization 
   -0.00129 
(-1.04) 
0.00113 
(1.37) 
Book-to-market 
ratio 
   0.000212*** 
(5.31) 
0.000062* 
(2.45) 
Lagged 1 year 
Returns 
    0.85749*** 
(431.63) 
Lagged 2 year 
Returns 
    -0.13316*** 
(-67.07) 
Asset Growth     0.000335** 
(2.91) 
Constant -0.04385*** 
(-11.11) 
0.04647*** 
(3.55) 
0.28577*** 
(21.17) 
0.30509*** 
(12.72) 
0.03679** 
(2.29) 
Obs 156108 156108 156108 156108 139968 
Adj R2 0.0199 0.0005 0.0240 0.0241 0.6333 
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Table 8: Regression of Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Firm’s one-year forward Excess Returns 
1 1 2 21 it it it it it it it it it it it it it it it iit f tp pps t ttc f fmc b bm r r a agR eR                
Dependent variable, one-year-forward excess returns measured over January-December of calendar year t+1, is 
regressed on lagged of incentive compensation and other variables measured as of year t. Incentive compensation is 
measured through pay-performance sensitivity and cash compensation is the total cash compensation (TTC) collected 
from Execucomp. Explanatory variables include one year and three years lag of stock returns, lagged asset growth, 
market capitalization and BM ratio (Book-to-market ratio defined by Fama-French three factor model (1996)). The 
sample is from 1992 to 2013 and the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
Excess Returns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Log-PPS 0.03634*** 
(38.69) 
 0.04673*** 
(42.01) 
0.04938*** 
(41.14) 
0.00916*** 
(11.57) 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
 0.01283*** 
(6.06) 
-0.04340*** 
(-17.40) 
-0.03802*** 
(-14.58) 
-0.00689*** 
(-4.12) 
Firm Market 
Capitalization 
   -0.00837*** 
(-6.59) 
-0.000730 
(-0.88) 
Book-to-market 
ratio 
   0.000208*** 
(4.97) 
0.000081* 
(2.88) 
Lagged 1 year 
Returns 
    0.86075*** 
(433.20) 
Lagged 2 year 
Returns 
    -0.13138*** 
(-66.02) 
Asset Growth     0.00051** 
(3.54) 
Constant 0.01483** 
(3.66) 
0.07766*** 
(5.85) 
0.24399*** 
(17.71) 
0.37714*** 
(15.34) 
0.04566** 
(2.83) 
Obs 152409 152409 152409 152409 139968 
Adj R2 0.0097 0.0002 0.0117 0.0121 0.6317 
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Table 9: Regression of Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Firm’s Operating Performance (ROA) 
Dependent variable, ROA measured in calendar year t, is regressed on incentive compensation and other variables measured as of  
December of year t. Incentive compensation is measured through pay-performance sensitivity and cash compensation is the total 
cash compensation (TTC) collected from Execucomp. Explanatory variables include one year and three years lag of stock returns 
and lag of ROA. Other variables at t are regressed as asset growth, market capitalization and BM ratio (Book-to-market ratio defined 
by Fama-French three factor model (1996)). The sample is from 1992 to 2013 and the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
 Operating Performance (ROA)  Industry Adjusted Operating 
Performance (ROA) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Log-PPS  0.00052*** 
(7.09) 
0.00064*** 
(8.10) 
  0.00164*** 
(16.86) 
0.00109*** 
(10.45) 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
-0.00019 
(-1.23) 
 -0.00068*** 
(-4.10) 
 0.00400*** 
(19.56) 
 0.00316*** 
(14.39) 
Lagged ROA 0.93082*** 
(971.20) 
0.93031*** 
(968.06) 
0.93017*** 
(967.38) 
 0.83299*** 
(658.69) 
0.83124*** 
(655.20) 
0.83189*** 
(655.79) 
Firm Market 
Capitalization 
0.0017*** 
(22.17) 
0.00135*** 
(17.02) 
0.00145*** 
(17.50) 
 0.00482*** 
(47.68) 
0.00482*** 
(45.91) 
0.00439*** 
(40.26) 
Book-to-
market ratio 
0.0000021 
(1.00) 
0.0000012 
(0.88) 
0.000002 
(0.72) 
 0.000005 
(1.39) 
0.000002 
(0.44) 
0.0000032 
(1.02) 
Lagged 1 year 
Returns 
0.00076** 
(3.88) 
0.00067** 
(3.40) 
0.00643** 
(3.25) 
 0.000629* 
(2.42) 
(0.000277) 
(1.06) 
0.000419 
(1.61) 
Lagged 2 year 
Returns 
0.00107*** 
(5.38) 
0.00099*** 
(5.00) 
0.00098*** 
(4.94) 
 0.00141*** 
(5.40) 
0.00121*** 
(4.62) 
0.00126*** 
(4.83) 
Asset Growth 0.000039** 
(3.46) 
0.000039** 
(3.47) 
0.00004** 
(3.46) 
 0.000009 
(0.63) 
0.000009 
(0.61) 
0.00000963 
(0.64) 
Constant -0.02659*** 
(-18.63) 
-0.02245*** 
(-14.55) 
-0.02059*** 
(-12.81) 
 -0.22811*** 
(-121.14) 
-0.20932*** 
(-102.77) 
-0.21791*** 
(-102.75) 
Obs 139968 139968 139968  139968 139968 139968 
Adj R2 0.8777 0.8777 0.8777  0.7742 0.7740 0.7744 
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Table 10: Regression of Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Firm’s One-year forward Operating Performance (ROA)   
Dependent variable, one-year- forward ROA measured in calendar year t+1, is regressed on lagged of incentive compensation and 
other variables measured as of year t. Incentive compensation is measured through pay-performance sensitivity and cash 
compensation is the total cash compensation (TTC) collected from Execucomp. Explanatory variables include one year and three 
years lag of stock returns, lagged ROA, asset growth, market capitalization and BM ratio (Book-to-market ratio defined by Fama-
French three factor model (1996)). The sample is from 1992 to 2013 and the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
 One- year forward Operating 
Performance (ROA) 
 One-year forward Industry Adjusted 
Operating Performance (ROA) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
Log-PPS  0.00056*** 
(7.59) 
0.00063*** 
(7.87) 
  0.00163*** 
(16.74) 
0.00103*** 
(9.91) 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
-0.00011 
(0.72) 
 -0.00037* 
(-2.21) 
 0.00422*** 
(20.59) 
 0.00342*** 
(15.55) 
Lagged ROA 0.93109*** 
(972.75) 
0.93056*** 
(969.91) 
0.93049*** 
(969.31) 
 0.83339*** 
(660.05) 
0.83131*** 
(656.73) 
0.83297*** 
(657.45) 
Firm Market 
Capitalization 
0.00159*** 
(20.65) 
0.00129*** 
(16.16) 
0.00134*** 
(16.14) 
 0.00463*** 
(45.66) 
0.00469*** 
(44.49) 
0.00422*** 
(38.54) 
Book-to-
market ratio 
0.0000029 
(1.06) 
0.0000025 
(0.89) 
0.000002 
(0.79) 
 0.000005 
(1.43) 
0.000002 
(0.43) 
0.0000040 
(1.09) 
Lagged 1 year 
Returns 
0.00088*** 
(4.47) 
0.00080*** 
(4.08) 
0.00079*** 
(4.03) 
 0.00095** 
(3.66) 
0.000723 
(2.77) 
0.000811** 
(3.10) 
Lagged 2 year 
Returns 
0.00106*** 
(5.33) 
0.00097*** 
(4.91) 
0.00096*** 
(4.86) 
 0.00140*** 
(5.53) 
0.00117*** 
(4.45) 
0.00125*** 
(4.77) 
Asset Growth -0.0000028 
(-0.20) 
-0.0000031 
(-0.22) 
-0.0000032 
(-0.23) 
 0.000011 
(0.57) 
0.0000087 
(0.47) 
0.00000985 
(0.53) 
Constant -0.02610*** 
(-18.28) 
-0.02122*** 
(-13.72) 
-0.02023*** 
(-12.57) 
 -0.22550*** 
(-119.68) 
-0.20659*** 
(-101.3) 
-0.21576*** 
(-101.55) 
Obs 139968 139968 139968  139968 139968 139968 
Adj R2 0.8776 0.8777 0.8777  0.7739 0.7737 0.7741 
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Table 11: Regression of Pay-Volatility Sensitivity on Firm’s Risk Taking 
The table represents the relationship between pay-volatility Sensitivity on different risk taking measures.  Risk Taking-1 is the 
Log variance of daily stock return of fiscal year annualized and Risk Taking-2 is the standard deviation of ROA prior 5 years.  
Incentive compensation is measured through pay-volatility Sensitivity (PVS) and cash compensation is the total cash 
compensation (TTC) collected from Execucomp. The control variables are lagged one year (as of t-1). The Firm Policy variables 
are as of year t.  The sample is from 1992 to 2013 and the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
  Risk Taking-1  Risk Taking-2 
  (1) (2)  (1) (2) 
Executive 
Compensation 
PVS 
0.00012*** 
(8.21) 
0.000091*** 
(6.52) 
 0.000006*** 
(5.61) 
0.000008*** 
(7.12) 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
0.03677*** 
(10.75) 
0.0444*** 
(13.18) 
 0.00102*** 
(3.63) 
0.00143*** 
(5.03) 
Control 
Variables 
Size 
-0.23727*** 
(-147.83) 
-0.2296*** 
(-140.42) 
 -0.00077*** 
(-58.75) 
-0.00728*** 
(-53.13) 
ROA 
-0.2226*** 
(-71.90) 
-0.2545*** 
(-79.39) 
 -0.0022*** 
(-8.73) 
0.00029 
(1.16) 
Market to Book 
ratio 
0.0552*** 
(37.74) 
0.0446*** 
(29.74) 
 0.00602*** 
(50.16) 
0.00513*** 
(41.19) 
Firm Policy 
Leverage 
 0.4107*** 
(32.66) 
  0.00715*** 
(6.85) 
NetCapex 
 1.2798*** 
(32.41) 
  0.0445*** 
(13.60) 
RD 
 2.564*** 
(54.78) 
  0.1353*** 
(34.86) 
Constant 
-6.538*** 
(-319.08) 
-6.915*** 
(-325.24) 
 0.0706*** 
(42.05) 
0.05646*** 
(32.02) 
Obs 136712 136712  136712 136712 
Adj R2 0.1917 0.2179  0.0621 0.0713 
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Table 12: Simultaneous Equation Modeling (3SLS): PPS, ROA and Excess Returns 
The table represents the relationship between Pay-Performance Sensitivity on different firm performance measures. 
Dependent variables, Excess Return, ROA and PPS measured in calendar year t, is regressed on incentive 
compensation and other variables measured as of  December of year t. Instrumentals variables are age and size. 
Incentive compensation is measured through pay-performance sensitivity and cash compensation is the total cash 
compensation (TTC) collected from Execucomp. Instrumental variables include size of the firms and age of 
executives. Other variables are 1-year and 3-year lag of returns, 1-year of ROA, market capitalization and BM ratio 
(Book-to-market ratio defined by Fama-French three factor model (1996)). The sample is from 1992 to 2013 and 
the t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
 Stock Performance Operating Performance 
 PPS Excess Return ROA PPS 
PPS  0.104*** 
(26.36) 
0.011*** 
(25.65) 
 
Excess Return -0.945*** 
(-13.57) 
   
ROA    29.39*** 
(3.79) 
Total Cash 
Compensation 
0.846*** 
(128.04) 
-0.076*** 
(-23.07) 
-0.009*** 
(-25.45) 
0.815*** 
(17.37) 
Firm Market 
Capitalization 
0.733*** 
(124.82) 
-0.031*** 
(-16.40) 
-0.003*** 
(-14.25) 
0.55*** 
(14.10) 
Lagged 1 year 
Returns 
0.922*** 
(17.12) 
0.83*** 
(295.76) 
-0.0025*** 
(-8.90) 
0.18*** 
(16.95) 
Lagged 2 years 
Returns 
 -0.143*** 
(-53.38) 
0.017*** 
(16.88) 
 
Size -0.369*** 
(-68.70) 
  -0.233*** 
(-7.88) 
Age  -0.198*** 
(-16.08) 
0.017*** 
(16.88) 
 
Lag ROA   0.921*** 
(679.04) 
-27.16*** 
(-3.80) 
Book-to-Market 
ratio 
  -0.00002*** 
(-14.25) 
0.0011*** 
(6.78) 
Weighted R2 0.5295 0.5295 0.8388 0.8388 
 
